The chinese labor force
From May 1904, when the Americans took charge of the construction of the Panama Canal, it was felt that their inventiveness and genius would ensure them immediate success. However, two years later, things were in a state of chaos, soon to become a total failure.
The newly appointed Chief Engineer, John Stevens, understood Gorgas’ idea very well: first sanitize; then excavate. He gave him his unreserved support, even against the opinions and actions of several influential groups.
Although the incidence of yellow fever had dropped, malaria, pneumonia tuberculosis, and dysentery continued to take its toll on the labor force, particularly on the Barbadian blacks.
By December 1905, the dreaded yellow fever had been completely eradicated from Panama, a fact that decidedly had a marked psychological impact worldwide.
President Theodore Roosevelt could now feel quite satisfied, because he had made the right decision, inasmuch as his was the last word on whether to replace Gorgas or not.
Construction took on a new impetus, as did the increase in the number of workers, which was estimated at 24,000 by end of 1906.
Of this number, which represented almost every nation in the world, the great majority were blacks from Barbados--contrary to the popular belief that the Jamaicans were the majority. After the French collapse, the Jamaican government levied a tax on all workers who came to the Panama Canal.
Because the performance of this labor force was relatively poor and desertions were high, Chief Engineer Stevens thought of contracting Chinese workers. His experience with them had been very good in the building of the railroad in the U. S. northwest.
Inasmuch as it was an emergency situation, ads were placed immediately, in August 1906, in the newspapers, with the pertinent requests.
Initially, one company offered 2,500 Chinese and pursuant to their performance, they would go as high as 25,000 workers.
The Canal Commission knew of many persons who were interested in obtaining this contract, but when the bid solicitation was made, only four submitted bids.
One of them offered to contract unskilled labor at ten cents an hour, another at 12-1/2 cents, and another at 13. The fourth proposal was the most elaborate, offering 11 cents an hour to the first 2,500, with a partial decrease for each additional thousand, up to a total of 11,000. The rate would then be lowered to 9 cents an hour for up to 15,000 workers.
This commercialization of human beings brought about a large wave of protest in the United States, Panama, and China. In addition to the moral aspects of such a contract, there was also concern over the severe effect of the climate on this large number of physically unprepared foreigners entering Panama, for whom the differences in lifestyles of this region would only bring about disastrous results.
It was courting disaster to try to relocate massive quantities of men to a country thousand of miles away, where the foods were different, and where they would be exposed to the rigors of sweltering heat and a highly humid climate.
It was anticipated that the rates of mortality and morbidity would be very high, and the economic price to be paid would outweigh any savings that might be achieved from the low hourly wages to be paid.
A foreign workforce contracted to work on the Canal at an offer of wages lower than those of other groups, would only harbor resentment and create the potential for internal conflict.
The Chinese, who normally engaged in gardening, laundry, or retail trade would soon be walking away from those 9-cent-an-hour jobs that demanded maximum physical exertion.
Mass desertions were foreseen, and it was feared that the police would then have a new role trying to round up the large numbers of Chinese defaulting on their contracts.
There was also the legal matter of bans—both in the United States as in Panama—on the immigration of Chinese nationals.
The Government of China took a dim view of any citizen coming to work in Panama, because this name brought back memories of massive suicides of Chinese during the building of the railroad in 1856. The motive that led them to take this decision in Matachín, on the banks of the canal was always attributed to a depressive emotional state. The name of the place, Spanish for "killer" was purely coincidental; the townsite was not been given this name after the suicide incident; it had been so named even prior to the incident.
In addition to these arguments, the Chinese themselves residing in Panama sent the Imperial government a cable in which they expressed their resounding disapproval of any such workers coming to the Isthmus of Panama. They reported on the poor working conditions in the Canal, which would result in certain death for them on these shores. They feared more than anything else the possible competition their countrymen would pose, commercially, in an arena they already had monopolized in Panama, Colon, David, and Bocas del Toro.
Another voice of opposition to this proposal was heard from the Canal Zone Governor, Charles E. Magoon. He sustained that the Chinese would not be suitable to labor on the excavation works because of their poor physical condition and their natural tendency to remain in a job only long enough to save enough money to go into business for themselves for the purpose of becoming large-scale merchants.
With such a mountain of evidence against him, Stevens, considered by many as the forgotten hero of the Panama Canal, was unable to obtain these laborers who were sorely needed, and had to redirect all his efforts again to Barbados, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Jamaica.
